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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked as an appeal upon a final
order from the United States District Court for the District of
Progress. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). The jurisdiction of the district
court was appropriate under federal question jurisdiction as
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
The original
jurisdiction falls under federal question jurisdiction because the
controversy surrounds the Clean Water Act (“CWA” or “Statute”),
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The notice of appeal was filed in a
timely manner. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a); (R. at 5).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Whether Bonhomme, a French nationalist without
particularized injury, is the real party in interest under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17 to bring suit against Maleau for violating the CWA.
II. Whether Bonhomme is a “citizen” under 33 U.S.C. §
1365(g), who may bring suit against Maleau.
III. Whether Maleau’s mining waste piles are “point sources”
under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (14).
IV. Whether Ditch C-1, a seasonal irrigation ditch that
discharges into a water that is not navigable-in-fact, is a
navigable water/water of the United States under the CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7), (14).
V. Whether Reedy Creek, a stream that is not navigable-infact or a channel in interstate commerce, is a navigable
water/water of the United States under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7), (12).
VI. Whether Bonhomme violates the CWA by adding arsenic
to Reedy Creek through a culvert on his property even if
Bonhomme is not the but-for cause of the presence of arsenic in
Ditch C-1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee Jacques Bonhomme (“Bonhomme”), a French
national living in the State of Progress and working for Precious
Minerals International, Inc., commenced this action against
Maleau under the citizen suit provision of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §
1365. (R. at 4). Bonhomme alleges that Maleau violates the
CWA because waste from Maleau’s business contaminates Ditch
C-1 with arsenic, eventually discharging into Reedy Creek, an
alleged interstate, navigable water. (R. at 5).
The State of Progress (“Progress”) joined this action by
filing a citizen suit against Bonhomme, alleging that Bonhomme
was in violation of the CWA because arsenic is entering Reedy
Creek through a culvert on Bonhomme’s property. Id. Maleau
subsequently intervened in Progress’s action against Bonhomme
under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B). Id. The cases were consolidated
as Bonhomme v. Maleau. Id.
The defendant in each suit filed motions to dismiss. Id. The
district court dismissed Bonhomme’s suit, holding that he was not
a proper plaintiff. (R. at 10). The district court held:
(1) Bonhomme is not a real party in interest according to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17;
(2) Bonhomme is not a “citizen” entitled to file a citizen suit
under the CWA, § 33 U.S.C.
1365(g);
(3) Maleau’s mining waste piles are not “point sources” under the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1265(12), (14);
(4) Ditch C-1 is not a navigable water because it is a point
source;
(5) Bonhomme violates the CWA by discharging pollutants into
Reedy Creek through his culvert;
(6) Reedy Creek is a water of the United States under the CWA,
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (12).

(R. at 1-2).
Bonhomme appeals the district court’s decision with respect
to the first four issues. Progress appeals the district court’s
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decision on issue (4). Maleau appeals the district court’s decision
for issue (6).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Jacques Bonhomme is a French citizen residing in the United
States where he serves as President of Precious Minerals
International, Inc. (“PMI”), an international gold mining and
extraction business. Bonhomme is a member of the PMI Board of
Directors, President, and owns the largest proportion of its stock
as a three percent shareholder. Bonhomme owns a hunting lodge
in Lincoln County, Progress, where he hosts hunting parties for
PMI clients and associates.
Shifty Maleau owns a nearby gold mining operation in
Lincoln County that directly competes with PMI.
Maleau
transports waste materials generated by the operation to his
other property in neighboring Jefferson County, and places them
in piles on his land. During periods of precipitation, rainwater
flows through the piles and forms naturally occurring channels in
the soil, which eventually deposit into a seasonal drainage ditch
running through his property known as Ditch C-1.
Previous landowners constructed Ditch C-1 to sufficiently
drain their properties for agricultural uses. The ditch runs
through several neighboring land parcels and contains drained
groundwater derived from saturated soil and rainwater runoff.
PMI facilitated testing of Ditch C-1 that indicates the presence of
the pollutant arsenic. The ditch ultimately discharges the
contaminated water through a culvert on Bonhomme’s property
into Reedy Creek, three miles from Maleau’s land.
Reedy Creek serves commercial and agricultural purposes in
both Progress and neighboring New Union.
It is neither
navigable-in-fact nor used for transporting commercial goods.
The creek ends in a wetlands area primarily owned and
maintained by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service known
as Wildman Marsh. PMI’s data indicates the existence of arsenic
in both the creek and the marsh.
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Bonhomme’s property partially fronts Wildman Marsh,
which he uses during his corporate hunting events. However,
recently both PMI’s profitability and the frequency of
Bonhomme’s parties have declined.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Bonhomme lacks standing in this matter because he is not
the real party in interest. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.), 17(a), defendants should not be
subjected to double liability if sued by third parties not properly
joined in suits where those third parties are real parties in
interest. In the instant case, PMI is the real party in interest, for
which Bonhomme is a front. PMI, rather than Bonhomme,
finances the sampling and analysis of Ditch C-1, Reedy Creek,
and Wildman Marsh. It additionally pays all of Bonhomme’s
attorney and expert witness fees. Lastly, PMI is the true
beneficiary of Bonhomme’s hunting events, many of which
entertain corporate clients and associates. Bonhomme therefore
does not have a direct injury or interest as required under the
CWA to bring a citizen suit.
The citizen suit provision of the CWA applies exclusively to
United States citizens and Bonhomme consequently lacks
standing as a French national. Congress did not authorize
foreign citizens to bring claims under the CWA. Rather, it
notably excluded foreign citizens from the definition of “person” in
the context of citizen suits, while incorporating juridical entities
that hold vested authority and domestic interests such as the
State, municipalities, corporations, and partnerships. Nowhere
in the CWA does Congress authorize litigation by foreign citizens.
Maleau is not liable as a polluter under the CWA because his
waste piles are not “point sources” pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §
1362(14). The Statute defines point sources as “discernible,
defined, discrete conveyance[s]” and provides a representative list
of structures that meet the definition, all of which connote human
made discharge or drainage systems.
The Statute’s plain
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language and supporting case law demonstrate that gravityformed soil channels depositing rainwater runoff from Maleau’s
waste piles into Ditch C-1 do not constitute a discrete conveyance,
therefore alleviating Maleau of CWA liability.
Ditch C-1 does not meet the statutory definition of “navigable
water” and therefore falls outside of the CWA’s jurisdiction.
Congress specifically intended to preserve traditional state
powers over land use planning and water resource management.
While Congress strove to clean the nation’s waters, it did not
intend to strip the States’ authority over their own waterways.
Accordingly, Congress limited the federal government’s
jurisdiction over navigable waters. Courts have acknowledged
that while the definition of “navigable” for purposes of the CWA
surpasses a traditional understanding of the word, its
conventional meaning is nonetheless significant.
Thus, for
federal jurisdiction over water that is not navigable-in-fact, the
Supreme Court held that the isolated water must have a
significant nexus or a continuous surface connection to a
navigable-in-fact water. Ditch C-1 does not qualify as navigable
water because it is not itself navigable-in-fact and it does not
satisfy the crucial element of connectivity to a navigable-in-fact
water. Ditch C-1 is a man-made drainage ditch that terminates
into Reedy Creek. Because Reedy Creek is a non-navigable
water, CWA jurisdiction does not extent to Ditch C-1.
Ready Creek is neither a traditionally navigable water nor
attached to a navigable-in-fact water body, and is therefore
beyond the reach of the CWA. Reedy Creek is not alleged to be
navigable-in-fact or capable of becoming navigable with
reasonable improvements. Reedy Creek is consequently not a
traditionally navigable water meaning it must connect to a
traditionally navigable-in-fact water for federal jurisdiction to
attach. Reedy Creek terminates into Wildman Marsh, an area
that does not qualify as a traditionally navigable water.
Although Reedy Creek crosses state lines and may affect
interstate commerce, Commerce Clause powers are extended over
navigable waters through the channels of the interstate
commerce prong. Reedy Creek is not used as an interstate
channel, which makes jurisdiction based on Commerce Clause
authority unjustified.
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If this Court determines that Reedy Creek is a navigable
water, Bonhomme is consequently liable under the CWA. The
Statute requires a federally issued National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit for discharging a
pollutant into a navigable water via a point source. Contrary to
Bonhomme’s claim, causation is not contemplated by this
provision of the CWA, making his assertion that Maleau is the
but-for cause of the arsenic contamination irrelevant.
Bonhomme’s ownership of the point source implicates his liability
under the CWA.
In light of the forgoing, the district court’s dismissal of
Bonhomme’s claims on the issues of standing and CWA liability
should be affirmed and the district court’s determination of Reedy
Creek as a navigable water under the CWA should be reversed.

STATEMENT OF APPELLATE STANDARD
OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss is properly granted when a plaintiff
alleges facts that, accepted as true, fail to state a claim for which
relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal,
the complaint’s factual allegations must comprise more than
labels and conclusions or a simple recitation of the cause of
action’s elements, and the right to relief must rise above a
speculative level. Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545
(2007).
Courts of Appeals review motion to dismiss determinations
de novo, in which legal issues are reconsidered. Findings of fact
by the district court are reviewed for “clear error.” United States
v. Ziskin, 360 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2003).
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ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING THAT BONHOMME IS NOT
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST UNDER FED. R.
CIV. P. 17(A) BECAUSE HE RESTS HIS CLAIM ON
THE INTERST OF A THIRD PARTY.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) states, “An action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest.” The purpose of Rule
17(a) is to protect a defendant against a subsequent claim,
ensuring the benefit of res judicata. See Curtis Lumber Co. v.
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 618 F.3d 762, 771 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding
that the real-party-in-interest rule does not bar suit because the
third party in question suffered no injury necessary to make the
defendant at risk of being doubly liable); Marina Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 318-19 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(reversing a denial of a motion to dismiss because the district
court’s judgment does not protect the defendant against a
subsequent claim by a third party, suggesting the plaintiff is not
the interested party under Rule 17(a)); United HealthCare Corp.
v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., 88 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1996)
(highlighting that Rule 17(a) is for the benefit of the defendant).
A plaintiff lacks the prudential standing to bring suit if he “rest[s]
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”
Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
The primary purpose of Rule 17(a) is to “protect the
defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually
entitled to recover.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a), Advisory Committee
Note. In Curtis Lumber, Curtis Lumber Company (“Curtis
Lumber”) sold its siding materials by taking advantage of a
promotional rebate offered by the Louisiana Pacific Corporation
(“LP”), a national manufacturer of building materials. 618 F.3d
at 767. Upon discovering additional requirements attaching to
the rebate, Curtis Lumber’s customers cancelled their orders and
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refused to pay. Id. Curtis Lumber sued based on lost profits, and
LP attempted to bar suit through Rule 17(a). Id. at 769. The
court decided that Curtis Lumber’s individual customers did not
suffer an injury in fact, which meant there was not a risk of
subsequent claims being filed against LP.
Id. at 771.
Accordingly, the court found Curtis Lumber to be the real party
in interest under Rule 17(a). Id.
In Marina Management, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
questioned whether Marina Management Services, Inc. (“Marina
Management”), acting as an agent, had the right to sue the
defendant on behalf of MIF Realty, L.P. (“MIF Realty”). 202 F.3d
at 318.
The court ultimately reversed the denial of the
defendant’s motion to dismiss because there were no protections
from a subsequent claim by MIF Realty for the money that
Marina Management sought to recover, thus in “noncompliance
with Rule 17(a).” Id. at 319.
Rule 17(a) bars Bonhomme from bringing suit against
Maleau because he is not the real party in interest, which would
leave Maleau open to subsequent claims. PMI is the real party in
interest in the current matter.
PMI has financed all of
Bonhomme’s attorney and expert fees associated with this case.
(R. at 7). PMI, not Bonhomme, funded the samples and analyses
supporting Bonhomme’s contention that the arsenic in Ditch C-1,
Reedy Creek, and Wildman originated on from Maleau’s property.
Id. If this Court allows Bonhomme’s claim to proceed, Maleau
would be subject to further claims brought by PMI, which is
contrary to the purpose of Rule 17(a). Unlike the facts in Curtis
Lumber, where the third-party customers of Curtis Lumber had
no injury, PMI has a very real injury in the form of lost profits,
which leaves Maleau open to duplicate liability. Bonhomme
claims an injury of hosting six less hunting parties per year than
he previously held. (R. at 6). Yet, the Record states he “is afraid
to use the marsh for his hunting parties,” which is not actually
owned by Bonhomme. Id. Bonhomme only owns the property
adjacent to the marsh, including his hunting lodge, where he does
not reside year-round, making the claim of injury tenuous. Id.
Additionally, losing six opportunities to host hunting parties is
not a direct injury to Bonhomme because these events serve the
business interests of PMI. See (R. at 6). Moreover, the
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connection between Reedy Creek and Bonhomme’s ability to
throw lavish parties for corporate executives and prospective
business associates is likely a spurious correlation. See Id.
Rather, the decrease in hunting parties is more likely attributed
to a declining economy that mirrors PMI’s loss in profitability.
PMI is the chief financier for all evidence and services related to
Bonhomme’s claim because of its deep-rooted financial stake in
the matter, which makes PMI the real party in interest rather
than Bonhomme.
Where the court in Curtis Lumber did not favor the use of
Rule 17(a) as a bar to bringing suit, this Court should
acknowledge the clear difference between a wealthy company
such as PMI and Curtis Lumber customers who simply decided
not to make a purchase.
Similar to the circumstances
surrounding Marina Management, where the court found Marina
Management to be an illegitimate agent for MIF Realty’s real
interest, Bonhomme, having no real injury, is not the real party
in interest. Bonhomme serves on the Board of Directors and as
President of PMI. (R. at 6-7). However, just as in Marina
Management, Bonhomme, as an agent is not expressly given the
right to sue on behalf of PMI. The possibility of Maleau being
sued by Bonhomme, and then again by PMI is precisely what
Rule 17(a) is designed to prevent. Maleau properly raised in a
timely manner PMI’s interest in his answer to Bonhomme’s
complaint in the lower court. (R. at 7). This Court should
following Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) and affirm the dismissal of
Bonhomme’s suit because Maleau had given a reasonable amount
of time for PMI to rightfully join the suit. Id. Because
Bonhomme is not the real party in interest and PMI can no
longer join the suit this Court should affirm lower court’s
dismissal of the Bonhomme’s claims on Rule 17(a) grounds.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING THAT BONHOMME IS NOT A
“CITIZEN” UNDER § 33 U.S.C. 1365(G).
The CWA authorizes any “citizen” to maintain suit against
violations of the Statute by using the citizen suit provision. 33
U.S.C. §1365. Citizen is defined as, “a person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected.” Id. “Person”
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is further defined as individuals, corporations, partnerships,
government, entities, etc. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5). Foreign
nationals are not expressly given authorization to commence
citizen suits under the CWA. Id. The Supreme Court held that
by broadening the term “navigable waters” as “waters of the
United States,” Congress did not deprive the term “navigable” of
all meaning. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (commonly referred to
as the SWANCC case); 33 U.S.C. §1362; (R at 8). “Similarly, the
CWA’s definition of the narrow concept of a ‘citizen’ of the United
States as the broader concept of a ‘person,’ does not deprive
‘citizen’ of its meaning.” (R. at 8). The entities listed, including
corporations, partnerships, States, municipalities, etc. are used to
define “persons.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). If Congress intended to
broaden the definition of citizen beyond that of American
citizenship and domestic entities in the juridical form, it would
have expressly written the section of the CWA as such.
The court, in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, found that
foreign entities do not have standing to challenge the EPA’s
actions under TSCA. 947 F.2d 1201, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1991).
The Fifth Circuit cites Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, in its
determination that it was unlikely foreign entities were “intended
[by Congress] to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of
the law.” 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). If the Fifth Circuit believes
foreign entities are not able to challenge the EPA on its decisionmaking to enforce environmental statutes like TSCA, then surely
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g), in its definition of “citizen” as “any
person or persons having an interest,” excludes foreign nationals.
In Corrosion Proof Fittings, Canadian petitioners interpreted
“any person” to mean anyone who could arrange transportation to
the courthouse. 947 F.2d at 1209. The court denied the
petitioners’ standing. Id. at 1211. The court further stated,
“[P]arties that Congress specifically did not intend to participate
in, or benefit from, an administrative decision have no right to
challenge the legitimacy of that decision.” Id. at 1210.
A reasonable application of SWANCC would hold that foreign
nationals are not given standing under the CWA to bring a
citizen suit because such a holding would deprive “citizen” of all
import. Accordingly, Bonhomme, as a foreign national of France,

11

126 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 5
does not have standing to bring suit against Maleau under the
CWA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(g), 1362(5); (R. at 8). Further, Corrosion
Proof Fittings supports this determination, albeit for another
United States environmental statute. This Court should affirm
the lower’s court’s decision to bar Bonhomme’s suit because he
lacks standing to bring a citizen suit under the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1365(g), 1362(5).
III. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING THAT MALEAU’S WASTE
PILES ARE NOT POINT SOURCES UNDER 33
U.S.C. § 1262(14) BECAUSE WASTE PILES ARE
NOT A DISCERNIBLE, CONFINED, OR DISCRETE
CONVEYANCE.
The district court properly dismissed Bonhomme’s claim that
Maleau’s waste piles constitute point sources under the CWA.
The Statute defines “point source” as “any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe,
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container,
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating aircraft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). Point sources from which
pollutants discharge into “navigable waters” require a permit
issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
under the NPDES. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Though the statutory
list is not exhaustive, the court may not indiscriminately add
items to it. Reading “waste piles” into the provision would
require an unjustified finding that they are analogous to the
discrete conveyances enumerated. See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). As the district court properly
determined, the plain language of the CWA and relevant case law
demonstrate that waste piles do not constitute point sources, thus
alleviating Maleau of liability under the Statute. Bonhomme’s
claim on this issue was therefore justly dismissed and should be
affirmed by this Court.
Bonhomme incorrectly asserts that Maleau’s piles of
overburden and slag constitute a point source pursuant to the
CWA. Overburden is characterized as the worthless layer of soil
and rock removed by miners to gain access to ores and minerals
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below the surface. Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals,
Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (D.N.M. 1995). Slag is a similar
stony byproduct of the smelting process. A & W Smelter and
Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998). The
district court dismissed Bonhomme’s claim based on the CWA’s
plain language, emphasizing that none of the point source
examples enumerated in the Statute remotely resemble waste
piles of such materials, and concluded “piles are not normally
considered to be conveyances.” (R at 9). The district court’s
reasoning is supported by the Second Circuit’s ruling in U.S. v.
Plaza Health Labs., Inc., establishing that the defining terms and
examples given in the Statute (“pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, etc.”) conjure images of physical
structures and systematic conveyances delivering pollutants from
industrial sources to navigable waterways. 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d
Cir. 1993). (“Although by its terms, the definition of ‘point source’
is nonexclusive, the words used to define the term and examples
given . . . evoke images of physical structures and
instrumentalities that systematically act as a means of conveying
pollutants from an industrial source to a navigable waterways”)
(emphasis added). Id. By contrast, Maleau’s waste piles do not
comprise a pollution delivery system designed to discharge into a
navigable waterway.
In Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Lewis, the Ninth Circuit
held that regarding mining operations, Congress intended
precipitation runoff involving pollutants to be considered
nonpoint sources. 628 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). There the
court established that merely asserting a hydrologic connection
between contaminated groundwater and surface waters is
insufficient to warrant point source classification. Such claims
must initially establish the existence of a point source to which
pollutants can be attributed, and that unless groundwatertransported pollution is traceable to a point source such as a
tank, pipeline, ditch or other such conveyance, it is not subject to
NPDES permitting requirements. Id. Lewis further established
that a “storm water drainage system” is precisely the type of
collection or channeling intended for regulation by the CWA. Id.
at 1152-53. Maleau’s property lacks the type of pollution
drainage scheme contemplated in Lewis. Unlike the examples
enumerated by the court, pollution from his waste piles is not
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discharged by a human made conveyance and should therefore be
classified as a nonpoint source.
Further bolstering Maleau’s assertion that his waste piles
are nonpoint sources pursuant to the CWA is the Government’s
definition of nonpoint source pollution (“NPS”), characterized by
EPA as that which is “caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over
and through the ground.” EPA’s Polluted Brochure EPA-841-F94-005, (1994), available at http://www.epa.gov
/owow/nps/qa.html. EPA further states, “as the runoff moves,
it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants
finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal
waters, and even our underground sources of drinking water.” Id.
EPA’s representation of nonpoint source pollution mirrors the
situation occurring on Maleau’s property in Lincoln County,
where precipitation flows through his discarded waste via
naturally occurring channels in the soil eventually terminating at
Ditch C-1.
Bonhomme’s reliance on Sierra Club v. Abston Cont. Co.,
Inc. is misplaced because the decision effectuates a circuit split
that is not supported by the weight of authority. 620 F.2d 41 (5th
Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit’s designation of waste piles in the
mining context as a point source is contrary to rulings mandating
that mining waste constitutes a point source only when
discharged from a source designed to collect or convey storm
water. See Consol. Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 249 (4th Cir.
1979) (stating the definition of point source excludes water that
has not been collected and channeled) (rev’d on other grounds);
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir.
1976) (finding that though the statutory definition is somewhat
broad it does not include uncollected and unchanneled rain water
runoff).
Lastly, the final element of the CWA’s point source
definition supports both the district court’s determination that
Maleau’s waste piles do not violate the Statute and Bonhomme’s
invalid dependence on Abston. In the current matter, gravityformed channels discharge into Ditch C-1, which (as established
in the following section) does not qualify as a navigable water or a
water of the United States under the Statute. Bonhomme’s
reliance on Abston in attempting to overcome the statutory
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language and establish Maleau’s waste piles as point sources is
invalid because the piles at issue in Abston discharged pollutants
into a navigable water. 620 F.2d at 44. The Abston court
specified that discharge from waste piles constitutes a point
source if channeled into a navigable water through “ditches,
gullies and similar conveyances.” Id. Maleau’s waste piles
discharge into Ditch C-1, which is not a navigable water, as
evidenced by the Abston court’s classification of ditches as
potential point sources. Id. Maleau’s waste piles are therefore
not a point source pursuant to the CWA because they discharge
into Ditch C-1, which does not qualify as a navigable water under
the Statute.
The plain language of the CWA and judicial interpretation of
its application clearly indicate that Maleau’s waste piles do
constitute a point source under the Statute. Because Maleau’s
waste piles are not within the CWA’s jurisdiction this court
should uphold the district court’s ruling on this issue.
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING THAT DITCH C-1 DOES NOT
QUALIFY AS A NAVIGABLE WATER OR A WATER
OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7), (12) BECAUSE DITCH C-1 DOES NOT
HAVE A CONTINUOUS SURFACE CONNECTION
OR A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TO A NAVIGABLE-INFACT WATER.
The CWA intends to preserve traditional State power to
regulate local pollution. The Statute specifically called for
“[c]ongressional recognition, preservation, and protection of [the]
primary responsibilities and rights of [the] States.” 33 U.S.C. §
1251(b). As a result, the federal government’s jurisdiction over
water is limited to navigable waters, which the Statute defines as
“waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id. §
1362(7).
The definitional ambiguity required both EPA to promulgate
regulations and courts to further clarify the agency’s jurisdiction.
The traditional definition of navigable waters was set forth in
United States v. Appalachia Electric Power Co., which defined
navigable waters as those having been used for waterborne

15

130 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 5
transportation or could be so used with reasonable improvements.
311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940). EPA vastly expanded the original
understanding of “navigable waters” by defining “waters of the
United States” to include such waters as all tributaries to
navigable waters, all interstate waters, and all inter and
intrastate waters that affect interstate commerce. 40 C.F.R. §
122.2 (2011).
While EPA has continuously extended its jurisdiction of
“navigable waters” and “waters of the United States,” the
Supreme Court clearly demonstrates by shaping federal authority
over navigable waters in recent cases that EPA’s jurisdiction
under the CWA is not limitless. See Rapanos v. United States,
547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (a plurality decision resulting in two
tests for determining when isolated wetlands fall under the
jurisdiction of the CWA); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174
(2001) (holding that navigable waters did not include isolated
ponds and wetlands used as a habitat by migratory birds crossing
state lines); and United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985) (holding that federal CWA jurisdiction
over wetlands extends only to those wetlands adjacent to
traditionally navigable waters). Following these precedential
decisions, neither Ditch C-1 nor Reedy Creek qualify as navigable
waters or waters of the United States. Thus, Maleau is not liable
for illegal discharges into either water.
Non-navigable ditches with regularly flowing water that are
not adjacent to or sufficiently connected to a traditionally
navigable water do not qualify as navigable waters or waters of
the United States under the CWA. See 474 U.S. at 134; 531 U.S.
at 172; 547 U.S. at 739. In United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. the Court held that the Army Corps of Engineers’
jurisdiction under the CWA extended to wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters. 474 U.S. at 134. The Court stressed the
difficulty of determining when water becomes solid ground in
approving the breadth of the Corps jurisdiction. Id. at 132.
Importantly, the Court focused on Congressional intent limiting
CWA jurisdiction over navigable waters. Id. at 136.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”) further defined
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jurisdiction over navigable waters by rejecting the Army Corps of
Engineer’s assertion of jurisdiction over isolated wetlands based
on its use as a habitat by migratory birds that cross state lines.
531 U.S. at 164. The Court found that when an administrative
interpretation of a Statute extends to the outer bounds of
Congressional power, a clear demonstration of Congressional
intent is required. Id. at 172. To extend CWA jurisdiction to
isolated, non-navigable waters would effectively write navigable
out of the Statute contrary to the Statute’s legislative intent. Id.
at 171.
Rapanos v. United States concerned two consolidated cases
(United States v. Rapanos and Carabell v. United States) in which
four Michigan wetlands located adjacent to ditches or human
made drains that eventually emptied into navigable waters were
subject to federal jurisdiction by the EPA and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. 547 U.S. 715, 729. Although the Rapanos
Court did not deliver a majority opinion, the plurality held that
wetlands not adjacent to traditional interstate navigable waters
must have a continuous surface connection to such waters so that
the distinction between waters and wetlands is unclear. Id. at
742.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supported a “significant
nexus” test to determine when jurisdiction could be exerted over a
wetland not immediately adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water.
To satisfy Justice Kennedy’s test, a significant nexus between the
wetland and navigable-in-fact water would be “assessed in terms
of the [CWA’s] goals and purposes,” including the restoration and
maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation’s waters. Id. at 779. Justice Kennedy suggested a
case-by-case analysis for regulation of wetlands adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters. Id. at 782.
Finally, the dissent would have held that CWA jurisdiction
applied following either the continuous surface connection or the
significant nexus test and encouraged lower courts to use either
test. Id. at 810. Under the plurality’s holding, an intermittently
flowing ditch would not qualify as navigable water, while under
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, a ditch, whether intermittent or
continuous, may support navigable water jurisdiction if a
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significant nexus between the ditch and a traditionally navigable
water is determined. Id. at 736, 803.
For the plurality, Justice Scalia stressed the plain-meaning
of the Statute’s words, positing that even when ditches
continuously hold water, ordinary parlance would describe such a
water as a river, creek, or stream. Id. at 736. When “ditch” is
invoked, it generally refers to something less than “waters.” Id.
Most importantly, under both the plurality and the concurrence,
an isolated water must be connected to a water that is navigable
in its own right.
In the current case, Ditch C-1 is not a navigable water
because it is not navigable-in-fact and is not adjacent to navigable
water. In Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court allowed
jurisdiction over a wetland that naturally flowed into a navigable
water so that it was difficult to determine where the navigable
water ended and the wetland began.
474 U.S. at 132.
Determining where Ditch C-1 ends and Reedy Creek begins is
irrelevant since Reedy Creek is not a navigable water. Ditch C-1
does not flow into a navigable water, and therefore, the deference
given in Riverside does not extend to this case.
Next, the Court’s holding in SWANCC demonstrated that
jurisdiction under the CWA cannot be extended to the outer
bounds of Congressional authority without clear authorization
from Congress. 531 U.S. at 172. Extending jurisdiction over
Ditch C-1—a non-navigable, manmade ditch that is not adjacent
to navigable water—would expand CWA jurisdiction to the point
of giving navigable no meaning. Such an expansion cannot be
sustained without clear support from Congress. On the contrary,
Congressional history demonstrates that the CWA was designed
to protect traditional States rights. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
Finally, Rapanos does not extend CWA jurisdiction in this
case. Since Ditch C-1 ends at Reedy Creek, which is not a
traditional interstate navigable water, the ditch cannot satisfy
either the continuous surface connection test or the significant
nexus test, because the key element of both tests—connection to a
navigable water—cannot be satisfied. Even following Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, and assuming that Ditch C-1 has a
significant nexus to Reedy Creek, jurisdiction would still not
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extend to Ditch C-1 because Reedy Creek is neither a navigablein-fact water or a tributary of a navigable water.
In conclusion, this Court should uphold the lower court’s
finding that Ditch C-1 does not qualify as navigable water or
water of the United States under the CWA because Ditch C-1
does not have a connection to a traditionally navigable water.
While this section has assumed that Reedy Creek is not a
navigable water or a water of the United States for purposes of
the CWA, the next section will demonstrate that under relevant
case law, Reedy Creek cannot be considered a navigable water or
a water of the United States.
V. THIS COURT SHOULD RESERVE THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING THAT REEDY CREEK
QUALIFIES AS NAVIGABLE WATER OR A WATER
OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7), (12) BECAUSE REEDY CREEK IS
NEITHER A NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT WATER NOR A
WATER WITH A CONTINUOUS SURFACE
CONNECTION OR A SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TO A
NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT WATER.
As previously discussed, the CWA intends to maintain
traditional state power over local land use planning, including the
development and use of water resources. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
Congress recognized that the sovereignty of the States entitled
each State to exert control over the restoration, preservation, and
enhancement of their own water resources. Id. Reedy Creek is
neither navigable-in-fact nor connected to a navigable-in-fact
water. To extend federal jurisdiction over waters, such as Reedy
Creek, would improperly extend the power of the Commerce
Clause. As articulated by the SWANCC Court, expansion to the
outer limits of Commerce Clause authority must be accompanied
by a clear demonstration of Congressional intent. 531 U.S. at
172. This Court should hold that Reedy Creek does not qualify as
a “navigable water” or a water of the United States because
interstate waters must be navigable-in-fact or connected to
navigable-in-fact waters for CWA jurisdiction to apply. See
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006); United States
v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v.

19

134 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 5
Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Deaton,
332 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 2003).
Rapanos concerned the connection between wetlands and
navigable-in-fact waters to determine whether CWA jurisdiction
applied to the isolated wetlands. For the plurality, Justice Scalia
specifically noted the importance of States’ rights to control land
and water resources and that “waters of the United States” was
not a clear authorization from Congress to stretch the Commerce
Clause power to encroach on States’ rights. 547 U.S. at 737-8.
The plurality concluded that “waters of the United States” means
“a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional
interstate navigable waters.” Id. at 741. Thus, if a water is not
navigable-in-fact, it can only be covered under the CWA if there is
a connection to a navigable-in-fact water.
Following Rapanos, the Eleventh Circuit held in Robison that
CWA jurisdiction can be exerted over a non-navigable creek if
there is a significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water. 505 F.3d
at 1221. Concluding that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was
controlling precedent in Rapanos, the Eleventh Circuit remanded
the case because the jury instructions concerning “navigable
waters” did not include “significant nexus.”
Id. at 1222.
Accordingly, the jury was to decide if the Avondale Creek, a nonnavigable water, caused chemical, physical, or biological effects
on the Black Warrior River, a navigable-in-fact body of water. Id.
Thus, under either the plurality or concurrence in Rapanos, the
water in question must be connected to a navigable-in-fact water.
Without that essential element, CWA jurisdiction cannot be
extended to the water in question.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held in Deaton that federal
jurisdiction over navigable waters is derived from the federal
government’s authority to regulate the channels of interstate
commerce. 332 F. 3d 698, 706. The court established the three
prongs of federal Commerce Clause authority United States v.
Lopez—the
channels
of
interstate
commerce,
the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities
substantially related to interstate commerce—before concluding
that navigable water is situated under the channels prong. Id. at
705-6. The court then likened channels of interstate commerce to
highways, which move goods from one state to another. Id. at
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707. Therefore, when the federal government exerts Commerce
Clause power over a water, it must be based on the water’s use as
a highway of interstate commerce to move goods across state
lines.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Moses that an interstate
creek qualified as a water of the United States under the CWA
because it eventually flowed into a navigable-in-fact water. 496
F.3d at 988. In this case, the court held the defendant liable for
attempting to divert Teton Creek without a CWA permit because
Teton Creek qualified as a water of the United States as a
tributary to Teton River. Id. Although Teton Creek was an
interstate water, that fact alone was not enough to satisfy CWA
jurisdiction; the court additionally relied on the connection to a
navigable-in-fact water.
In the current case, it is undisputed that Reedy Creek is not
navigable-in-fact and cannot be made so with reasonable
improvements. (R. at 9). To hold that Reedy Creek is a water of
the United States would unduly infringe upon the States’
traditional rights to control land and water resources, specifically
addressed in Rapanos. 547 U.S. at 737-8. Both the plurality and
the concurrence based jurisdiction over non-navigable water on
that water’s connection to a navigable-in-fact water. Id. at 741.
Reedy Creek is not navigable-in-fact and terminates in Wildman
Marsh, a wetland that is also not navigable-in-fact. (R. at 5-6).
Therefore, Reedy Creek lacks the connection to a traditionally
navigable water necessary to exert jurisdiction.
This argument finds further support in Robison, where the
court concluded that a creek could qualify as a water of the
United States as a non-navigable tributary if the creek had a
significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water. 505 F.3d at 1222.
Reedy Creek terminates into Wildman Marsh, a wetland that is
not navigable-in-fact. (R. at 5). Although Wildman Marsh is
used as a habitat by migratory birds, the Court rejected using
this argument for “waters of the United States” purposes in
SWANCC. 531 U.S. 159, 174. The opposing parties’ argument
for jurisdiction rests on the presumption that since Wildman
Marsh is located on federal land, it qualifies as a water of the
United States, making Reedy Creek a tributary of a water of the
United States. Although the CWA requires that all branches of
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the federal government with jurisdiction over any property
comply with all federal laws, the CWA does not regulate nonnavigable wetlands that do not have a connection to a navigablein-fact water. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a). Wildman Marsh is not
navigable-in-fact and does not have a continuous surface
connection or significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact water,
therefore, Wildman Marsh is not covered by the CWA. Thus,
Wildman Marsh is not governed by CWA requirements.
The opposing parties next argue that Reedy Creek is
necessary for interstate travel, because Reedy Creek is used as a
water supply for a service area supporting interstate travelers
and irrigation for agricultural purposes. (R. at 5). However, this
argument supports Commerce Clause jurisdiction based on Reedy
Creek’s affect on interstate commerce, rather than Reedy Creek’s
use as a channel of interstate commerce. The Fourth Circuit held
that Commerce Clause jurisdiction over navigable waters is based
on the government’s authority to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce. 332 F. 3d 698, 706. Reedy Creek is not
used to move goods in interstate commerce, which means
Commerce Clause jurisdiction does not extend to Reedy Creek.
Moreover, the Rapanos Court’s focus on traditional,
interstate navigable waters to limit federal regulation clearly
demonstrates how authority under the Commerce Clause may
only be used in connection to channels of interstate commerce.
547 U.S. 715, 739. The opposing parties point to United States v.
Earth Science, in which an interstate creek with uses similar to
Reedy Creek was included under CWA jurisdiction. 599 F.2d 368,
375 (10th Cir. 1979); (R. at 10). Earth Science is a pre-Rapanos
case that improperly focuses on an interstate creek’s affects on
interstate commerce instead of an interstate creek’s use as a
channel of interstate commerce. Earth Science is not controlling
precedent on this issue.
Without use as a channel in interstate commerce, jurisdiction
over Reedy Creek rests on the fact that the Creek crosses state
lines; but the extension of jurisdiction over any water that crosses
state lines is an impermissible expansion of federal authority. In
United States v. Moses, the Ninth Circuit held that an interstate
creek was a water of the United States because the creek was a
tributary to a navigable-in-fact water. 496 F.3d at 988. While in
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this case, Reedy Creek is an interstate water, Reedy Creek is not
a tributary to a navigable-in-fact water. This Court should not
uphold EPA regulation that defines “waters of the United States”
as “all interstate waters” because it is an abuse of Commerce
Clause power. 40 C.F.R. 122.2 (2011).
Courts generally grant Chevron deference to an agency for
legislative rules, such as EPA’s definition of “waters of the United
States.” Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Chevron deference requires the courts to answer two
questions: (1) Whether Congressional intent of a statute is clear;
and (2) If the statute is ambiguous, whether the agency’s
interpretation was reasonable or permissible. Id. at 842-3. In
this case, “navigable water,” defined as “all waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas” is unquestionably
ambiguous. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Therefore, this Court must
move to the second question under Chevron: whether the agency’s
interpretation that “navigable water” means any interstate water
is a reasonable interpretation of the Statute. This Court should
find that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable. Non-navigable
waters—even interstate waters—must have a connection to
navigable-in-fact waters for federal jurisdiction to apply.
Congress specifically limited the EPA and Army Corps of
Engineer’s jurisdictional power by limiting authority to navigable
waters. Id.
To accept EPA interpretation of navigable water to include
all interstate water, whether that water is isolated from
navigable-in-fact water or not, would deprive “navigable” of all
meaning. The Supreme Court has noted on numerous occasions
that although the definition of navigable is expanded under the
CWA, the term must be given some effect. See United States v.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 776 (Kennedy, J. concurrence); Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v United States Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172; and United States v.
Riverside Bayside Homes, Inc. 474 U.S. 121, 133 (acknowledging
that while “navigable” is of limited import, jurisdiction was based
on significant nexus to navigable water).
In conclusion, Reedy Creek is neither navigable-in-fact nor
connected to a navigable-in-fact water. Furthermore, jurisdiction
over Reedy Creek cannot be established under the Commerce
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Clause because Reedy Creek is not used as a channel of interstate
commerce. Accordingly, this Court should find that Reedy Creek
does not qualify as a navigable water or water of the United
States under the CWA.

VI. SHOULD THIS COURT FIND THAT REEDY
CREEK QUALIFIES AS A NAVIGABLE WATER, IT
SHOULD THEN UPHOLD THE DISTRICT
COURT’S RULING HOLDING BONHOMME
LIABLE FOR DISCHARGING A POLLUTANT
INTO A NAVIGABLE WATER UNDER 33 U.S.C. §
1311(A) BECAUSE BONHOMME IS THE OWNERIN-FACT OF THE POLLUTANT’S POINT SOURCE.
Bonhomme owns a point source from which arsenic, a known
pollutant, is discharged into Reedy Creek and if this Court
establishes Reedy Creek as a navigable water, Bonhomme is in
violation of the CWA for his culvert’s release of contaminants into
it. (R. at 5). To successfully establish a claim under this
provision of the CWA a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating
that the opposing party discharged pollutants into a navigable
water without a proper permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1). As
previously established, the “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a point
source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). The Statute defines point source”
as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance . . . from
which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. §
1362(14). Bonhomme owns a culvert from which arsenic, a
known pollutant, is discharged into Reedy Creek. R. at 5.
Culverts are judicially recognized as point sources under the
CWA. Dague v. Burlington 935 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (2d Cir. 1991),
rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). It logically follows
that if this Court establishes Reedy Creek as a navigable water
Bonhomme is in violation of the CWA for his culvert’s release of
pollutants into Reedy Creek.
Bonhomme’s attempt to escape liability owing to Maleau’s
alleged upstream discharge of arsenic via the waste piles on his
Lincoln County property is unfounded. As the district court aptly
notes after examining the plain language of the Statute, the CWA
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definitions of “discharge” and “addition” do not include a
causation element. (R. at 9). An examination of relevant case
law reveals that courts likewise do not interpret it as such. The
Supreme Court held that pollutant discharge includes point
sources that themselves do not generate impurities. S. Florida
Water Mgt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105
(2004) (“Tellingly, the examples of ‘point sources’ listed by the
[CWA] include pipes, ditches, tunnels, and conduits, objects that
do not themselves generate pollutants but merely transport
them”.) Therefore, the fact that Bonhomme’s culvert does not
produce arsenic is irrelevant to establishing his liability under
the CWA. The determinant factor is its discharge into Reedy
Creek, provided this Court finds that Reedy Creek constitutes a
navigable water under the Statute.
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. similarly
established that point source owners could be liable for the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters occurring on their
land, whether or not their actions caused said discharge. 421
F.3d 1133, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005). In that case a property owner
violated the CWA though the he did own or operate the business
generating the pollution into the navigable stream. The court
held that the Statute intended for successive owners of point
sources to assume responsibility for activity on his or her
property regardless of personal action. Id. In its decision, the
Tenth Circuit established that “if you own the leaky faucet you
are responsible for the drips.” Id. at 1145. Further support for
this interpretation is found in the regulations promulgated by
EPA pursuant to the CWA, which define the phrase “addition of
any pollutant” as “surface runoff which is collected or channeled
by man; discharges through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances
owned by a . . . person which do not lead to a treatment works;
and discharges through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances,
leading into privately owned treatment works.” Id.; 40 C.F.R. §
122.2; see also EPA Notice, 55 Fed.Reg. 35248–01 (Aug. 28, 1990)
(stating drainage from abandoned mines can be point source
pollution where the owner can be identified; otherwise, it is
nonpoint source pollution). As the Tenth Circuit notes, this
regulation, though not a substitution for statutory language
nevertheless bolsters the assertion that ownership of a point
source triggers liability. El Paso, 421 F.3d at 1144.
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Statutory language and relevant case law therefore support
Maleau’s assertion that, assuming Reedy Creek is deemed a
navigable water by this Court, Bonhomme violates the CWA by
discharging arsenic into it through the culvert on his property.
The district court’s ruling on this issue should therefore be
upheld.

CONCLUSION

This Court should not entertain Bonhomme’s citizen suit
under the CWA, because Bonhomme is neither the real party in
interest nor a citizen for the purposes of the Statute. Should this
Court permit standing, Maleau should still not be held liable for
arsenic discovered in Ditch C-1 and Reedy Creek. Maleau’s waste
piles do not constitute point sources for the purposes of the CWA
and are thus not subject to CWA regulation. Further, neither
Ditch C-1 nor Reedy Creek qualify as navigable waters or waters
of the United States under the CWA. Consequently, Maleau
cannot be held liable under a federal statute that does not grant
federal jurisdiction over the waters in question. Finally, even if
this Court expands federal jurisdiction over Reedy Creek, then
Bonhomme is liable for the discharge of a pollutant from a point
source into a navigable water. Accordingly, this Court should
dismiss the actions against Maleau.
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